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more than twenty years after those treated by Cary in this book. What 
Augustine came to see by the end of the fourth century, according to Cary, is 
that in spite of the imago Dei, the deep kinship of the soul to God, God must 
always be praeter an imam, other than and beyond the soul. God can be 
looked for in the inner space of the soul, a space which is in some sense infi-
nite (the exploration of memory reveals no end to its capacities) and in some 
sense everlasting (it will have no end in time), but which is not identical to 
God. This picture of the soul, given in its most gorgeous literary form in the 
tenth book of the Confessions, is what Cary means by Augustine's invention 
of the inner self. The doctrine of sin is still not fully developed, but 
Augustine has moved sufficiently far from (for example) the Soliloquies of 
387, that he no longer makes the soul and God necessarily co-existent. The 
inner self is a place in which God's traces may be found, an extended 
metaphor for God; but it is no longer a place identical in essence with God, 
nor a place inseparable from God. 
This book is not the work of a philosopher with precise and analytical 
tastes. Its principal value does not lie in the drawing of careful distinctions or 
the offering of coercive and complex arguments. It is nonetheless a valuable 
and important book, both for those interested in Augustine's thought, and 
for those wanting, as Augustine wanted, to think Christian thoughts about 
matters of philosophical interest. For the former, Cary's analysis of 
Augustine's Plotinianism will no doubt provide fertile grOlmd for future dis-
cussion. For the latter, his richly textured depiction of how a particular 
Christian at a particular time-Augustine at the end of the fourth century-
actually thought, has some important lessons to teach. Augustine wanted to 
think as a Christian, to think Christian thoughts about the materials (biblical, 
creedal, liturgical, conceptual) provided him by the church, handed down to 
him by the tradition. But he found that the tradition did not provide him 
with everything he needed in order to think Christian thoughts about tl1e 
nature of the soul, and so he was pressed by his conversion to study 
Platonism more deeply than before precisely in order to find what he need-
ed. This is a portrayal of the intellectual situation of every Christian thinker; 
it ought to be immediately recognizable and nourishing to readers of this 
journal, and it may also serve as a corrective to those who want to think 
Christian thoughts but who take themselves to have no need of the gold of 
the Egyptians (Exodus 3:21-22, 12:35-36) in order to do so. 
Warranted Christian Belief, by Alvin Plantinga, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford and New York, 2000 ISBN 0-190513192-4 - 0-19-513193-2(pbk) 
pp. xx + 508. $60.00 (hardcover), $24.95 (paperback). 
ROGER TRIGG, University of Warwick 
This is the eagerly awaited sequel to Plantinga's tvvo earlier books on epis-
temology, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper Function. 
This one is, however, about the rational acceptability of Christian belief, 
and is rooted firmly in Christian tradition, following such apparently dis-
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parate figures as Aquinas and Calvin. The result is a feast of detailed argu-
ment and important insights that will stimulate much study and discus-
sion. The book is undoubtedly one of the most important to have appeared 
in the field of the philosophy of religion for many years, and is all the more 
challenging since it combines a deep Christian faith with the highest stan-
dards of argument derived from contemporary epistemology. Plantinga 
hopes that it may even appeal to a general reader, but what he himself 
refers to as the book's 'inordinate length' will not help in that respect. He 
adopts the rather desperate measure of sometimes printing more detailed 
discussions in small print, in order to cater for the specialist, and to encour-
age others to skip parts. Yet either the discussions are an integral part of 
the argument and should be read, or they should never have been includ-
ed in the first place. The result is certainly a somewhat unwieldy book, 
which may prove off-putting to some. As a result it may be less effective 
and influential than it deserves to be. 
Plantinga's views will already be familiar to followers of so-called 
'reformed epistemology.' He holds that some religious beliefs are as basic as 
any belief arising from our perception or our memory. His argument is that 
a religious believer" can be perfectly rational in accepting some of her beliefs 
in the basic way - not on the basis (probabilistic or otherwise) of other 
beliefs" (p. 442). We may believe there is a God, even if we have no reasons 
or evidence as such. Suggesting that we should have evidence, is, for 
Plantinga, to resort to 'evidentialism.' In fact, he is writing from a Calvinist 
tradition, which tends to distrust human reason, not least because it is infect-
ed by sin. Instead of using evidence to form judgments about what is true, he 
sees faith in less rational terms, as something causally produced. 
Where does such belief come from? Plantinga's answer is to suggest 
causal processes, which, as in the case of reliable sense perception, connect 
us with the origins of belief. He argues for a so-called 'sensus divinitatis' 
within us. It is a faculty, which, when triggered, delivers certain beliefs 
about God. A natural knowledge of God may arise in us, he says, as a 
result of the perception of the night sky, a mountain vista, or similar glo-
ries. He says: "They are occasioned by the circumstances; they are not con-
clusions from them" (p.175). He earlier defines the 'sensus divinitatis' as 
"a disposition or set of dispositions to form theistic beliefs in various cir-
cumstances, in response to the sorts of conditions or stimuli that trigger the 
working of this sense of divinity" (p.173). The idea is that our cognitive 
faculties have been designed by God, and amongst them is what Plantinga 
calls 'a belief-producing faculty (or power, or mechanism), that under the 
right conditions produces beliefs that are basic, in the sense that they are 
not based evidentially on other beliefs. One problem, of course, is how we 
are to know what the right conditions are. Another mechanism at work, 
Plantinga believes, is specific to Christianity. He appeals to both Aquinas 
and Calvin to show how convictions can come "by way of the activity of 
the Holy Spirit" (p. 251). According to this model, 'faith is belief in the 
great things of the gospel that results from the internal instigation of the 
Holy Spirit'. The Bible can thus be a vehicle for faith, but not an argument 
to it. Faith becomes, after all, the result of supernatural intervention. It is 
neither produced by reason, nor is it susceptible to rational investigation, 
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though Plantinga significantly does concede that there could be arguments 
for giving it up, termed by him U defeaters./I 
One of the strengths of this approach is the way in which it takes reli-
gious beliefs seriously enough to suppose that they do not have to be sub-
ordinated to other forms of belief. Why should we only trust our senses, 
and use them as a standard by which to judge faith? Trust in the deliver-
ances of our senses, and trust in the product of 'faith' may not be so very 
different. Another strength is Plantinga's unremitting realism. God exists 
independently of belief and may be regarded as its causal origin. There 
may therefore be good reason for our having the theistic beliefs we do, 
even if we cannot ourselves give it. We may be justified, without being able 
to offer a justification. 
Yet there are bound to be some misgivings about the overall project, 
however impressive it is. Some people will have a basic belief that God 
exists, and others not. Plantinga seems to be ruling out any way of rational-
ly resolving this, even if one side is right and the other wrong. His pro-
gramme is influenced by naturalist pictures of epistemology, which 
explain the reliability of our beliefs in terms of a causal story. Yet because 
he is far from being a metaphysical naturalist, he can allow a significant 
causal role to a transcendent God. Our beliefs, though, are still only prop-
erly grounded with the right causal background. Grounding is in this case 
a causal, rather than a rational, process. This allows a connection with an 
external reality, but in the end, all such causal explanations find it difficult 
to account for normativity. We may happen to believe something. Ought 
we to? The issue of truth is difficult to recover when a wholly causal 
account is given. Causal stories tend to be illuminating only if we already 
know what is true and what is illusory. We have to be able to distinguish 
reliable from unreliable causal chains. 
Plantinga is happy to talk in terms of faculties, processes and even 
mechanisms. Yet the idea that our cognitive faculties operate mechanically 
sits rather uneasily with a theistic view of reason. We should see things as 
they are, but that does not mean that the world is just an automatic trigger 
for beliefs. Saying that reality is the occasion for belief, and not the reason 
for it, removes any intrinsic connection between our beliefs and what they 
are about. If the beauty and grandeur of nature are mere stimuli that trig-
ger the working of a sense of divinity, the relationship is causal. Natural 
theology would argue from facts in nature to the existence of God, giving 
the one as evidence for the other. Plantinga opposes this. Yet once a causal 
connection is set up, why should not, say, the grandeur of nature actually 
trigger atheistic beliefs or a belief in a devil? There is no reason cormecting 
fact with belief. Anything could be a trigger for anything. No doubt the 
answer will come that we have not been designed like that. Faith is given 
by the grace of God in those circumstances. This, though, is a statement 
from the standpoint of faith, and does nothing to explain why some con-
nections are set up and not others. Are they arbitrary, or do they reflect the 
rationality of the Creator? If so, why cannot we be supposed, at least in 
part, to share in that rationality, and understand, if dimly, an inherent 
rationality present in the world, reflecting the mind of its Creator? 
There are other philosophical issues at stake. The causal model of God's 
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grace may fit in well with a determinist view of the world. 'TIwre are even 
echoes in it of old arguments about predestination. Why does God select 
some and not others, as recipients for the gift of faith? If the offer is open to 
all, why is it triggered only on selective occasions? The use of the term 
'mechanism,' in connection with our cognitive faculties, downgrades ratio-
nality in favour of causal processes presumably having their origin in God. 
Yet reason is important in human beings because of its associations with 
universality and freedom. Without the ability to exercise a (God-given) rea-
son, we are at the mercy of particular causal pressures, whether emanating 
from the Holy Spirit or not. Calvinist doctrines of election hover in the 
background. Not all are chosen. Being subject to reason, and being able 
ourselves to choose freely and responsibly, are different sides of the same 
coin. We can adopt beliefs about what is objectively true, and choose to act 
for reasons which ought to hold for everyone. The paradigm of creative 
freedom is that of the Creator, and in Christianity it has traditionally been 
held we were made in God's image. Plantinga's account, by downplaying 
the role of rationality, suggests that we cannot reflect, even partially, the 
rational freedom of God. 
Further, an emphasis on rationality carries with it an implied claim to 
universality. All humans could then share it, and it is not a particular gift 
to a few, bestowed on arbitrarily chosen occasions. On the other hand, any 
view of faith which grounds it in a way that does not make reasoned 
claims, cannot be expected to be listened to by those outside it. The down-
playing of the role of reason in linking our faith to reality can only mean 
that we appear to live in a world constructed by a particular faith. 
Inevitably, the emphasis then changes from the character of the reality we 
all confront, whether religious believer or unbeliever, to the faith we do or 
do not hold. Plantinga deliberately does not allow a place for 'indepen-
dent' reasons. The result is that we cannot reason to faith, only from it. 
Even if I have had some direct experience of God, I will need some 
assurance that it was God I was experiencing. Once ideas of evidence and 
justification are given up, an arbitrary element creeps in. I can be caused to 
believe in God, but I can also be caused not to. Which line of causation is to 
be relied on? If there is no answer, we are inevitably forced back to rely on 
the standards of a community of faith, and that is relativism. Otherwise, I 
can be forced to retreat to my own personal convictions and experiences, 
but that is subjectivism. Without grounds that can recommend the content 
of my faith to others, religious claims to a knowledge of an objective reali-
ty, (which others should also share) must be given up 
The fact thct discussion of Plantinga's views takes us so directly to cen-
tral philosophical and theological controversies that have echoed down the 
centuries shows how important this book is. Written with great philosoph-
ical acuteness and incisiveness, it is also sensitive to the deepest theological 
issues. It should be a starting-point for discussion in the philosophy of 
religion for years to come, and could be used with great profit in any seri-
ous University course on the subject. 
